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That there is an urgent need to extend income and social protection to the poor is
widely recognised. One, there is greater appreciation of the fact that income and social
protection to the poor is not only an end in itself but also a means to achieving higher
economic  growth.  Two,  because  the  adverse  effects  of  greater  economic  integration
(through liberalisation and globalisation) are likely to be on the poor.
In the mitigation of poverty, there is increasing appreciation of the role played by
risks in the lives of the poor. It is not sufficient to provide the poor with income alone. For
making any meaningful and lasting impact in their lives, there is a need to also protect
them from the several risks such as  risk of illness, death, loss of assets, and so  forth.
Accordingly, micro insurance, which is basically insurance for the low income people, is
gaining importance not only in India but also in other developing countries. In India we
find many community based insurance initiatives taking roots partly because of their felt
needs and also because of policy design as in the social obligation imposed by the Indian
insurance regulator.
In  some  of  the  initiatives  involving  low-income  people,  the  members  of  an
insurance scheme have themselves contributed (even if partly) towards paying insurance
premium for covering against risks. The early success of these initiatives points towards
the possibility of mobilising funds from the beneficiaries themselves. It is an open issue to
what extent the poor can contribute towards paying premium. If the poor are unable to
contribute it may be not due their lack of ability per se but because of  the  prevailing
institutional rigidities. This paper explores this particular issue and provides some valuable
insights.  In  particular,  the  finding  that  institutional  rigidities,  such  as  credit  market
constraints, may prevent the people from demanding insurance that they can otherwise
afford  is  an  important  message  that  ought  to  be  taken  note  of  by  the  policy  makers,
insurance initiators, social activists and all others working for the upliftment of the poor.
Arvind Virmani




Community based micro insurance has aroused much interest and hope in meeting health
care challenges facing the poor. In this paper we explore how institutional rigidities such as
credit  constraint  impinge  on  demand  for  health  insurance  and  how  insurance  could
potentially prevent poor households from falling into poverty trap. In this setting, we argue
that  the  appropriate  public  intervention  in  generating  demand  for  insurance  is  not  to
subsidise premium but to remove these rigidities (easing credit constraint in the present
context). Thus from insurance perspective as well, our analysis highlights the importance
of having appropriate savings and borrowing instruments for the poor.
Key Words: Micro-insurance, Micro-credit, Credit Constraint, Demand for Insurance.1
I  Introduction
￿
After  micro-credit  is  the  turn  of  micro-insurance.
1  Of  late,  the  idea  of  micro-
insurance has caught the attention of researchers, NGOs, donor agencies, policy makers
and social scientists involved in tackling poverty. The optimism with the idea of micro-
insurance stems mainly from two different sources: one, from the success of micro-credit
programs
2 in ameliorating the conditions of the poor in different parts of the world by
enabling them through asset and/or skill formation to generate income on a sustained basis
(Morduch 1999a), and two, from the growing recognition of the role risk plays in the lives
of the poor, and hence the need for increasing the ability of the poor in dealing with the
variety of risks they face. Improving the risk management capacity of the poor has come to
be viewed an integral part of any poverty alleviation program (Holzmann and Jorgensen
1999).
3
Although, the empirical literature on the impact of micro-insurance schemes is still
limited, the available evidence seems to suggest that micro-insurance, if properly designed
and implemented, can provide an effective mechanism for meeting health care challenges
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1  We do not state this in any pejorative sense. We state this to point out the order in which research has
proceeded and also to hint at the order (between credit and insurance) we suggest in the paper.
2  Although credit and insurance are two very different concepts (for the difference between the two, see
Siegel et al. 2001), it is believed that the success of micro-credit shows how the impediments posed by
informational asymmetries (giving rise to the moral hazard and adverse selection problems) and those
relating to high transaction costs that prevent formal providers of financial services from catering to the
low-income section of a society, can be overcome.
3  According to Preker et al. (2001), motivation for the provision of health insurance also comes from the
failure of public sector to provide health care at reasonable cost.2
of the poor--that is, in reducing out-of-pocket health expenses of poor households and in
improving their access to health care services.
4
The potential of up-scaling, extending and expanding of micro-insurance programs
depends crucially on the issue of affordability, that is, to what extent resources for meeting
health  care  costs  can  be  mobilised  from  the  people  themselves.
5  Limited  reach  and
coverage of the existing micro-insurance programs by itself is not sufficient to question the
affordability of premium by the poor and hence justify the need for subsidising premium.
In this paper we explore the issue of affordability, and demonstrate with the help of a
simple analytical device how institutional rigidities, and in particular credit or borrowing
constraint,  suppresses  demand  for  insurance  by  the  low-income  households  who  can
otherwise afford to pay for insurance, and how in the absence of insurance household’s
vulnerability can push them into poverty trap.
6
The paper is organised as follows: in section 2 we give a brief overview of micro-
insurance,  and  highlight  the  importance  of  the  affordability  issue  in  the  context  of
community-based health insurance schemes in section 2; in section 3 we show with the
help of simple analytical device how easing of credit constraint could potentially increase
                                                
4  See Jakab and Krishnan (2001), Preker et al. (2001) for a summary of different case studies on the impact
of community-based-health insurance schemes.
5 Unlike micro-credit where transfer in the first instance takes place from the credit provider to the poor, in
case of insurance a reverse transfer  takes  place,  i.e.,  from  the  poor  to  the  insurance  provider  (for  a
promise of covering the loss resulting from a particular event). Therefore, in the context of insurance
affordability becomes an important issue.
6 The effect of borrowing constraint on the technology adoption by the poor farmers as well as on the risk
preference of the poor have been explored by Eswaran and Kotwal (1989, 1990) and Morduch (1994).
The effect of borrowing constraints on the savings behaviour too has been well covered in the literature
(see Besley 1995).3
demand for micro-insurance, in the absence of which a household runs the risk of falling
into poverty trap. In section 4 we review appropriate government intervention in the light
of our analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper.
II  Overview: Health Risks, Micro Insurance and Affordability
Insurance is not the only way of dealing with risks
7, and not all risks are insurable
8.
However, health risks such as those relating to illness, injury, disability, maternity and the
like are considered to be eminently insurable as these risks are mostly independent  or
idiosyncratic,  that  is,  not  correlated  among  community  members.
9  Moreover,  among
several  risks  facing  poor  households,  health  risk  is  considered  to  be  crucial  as  it  has
destabilising effect on household finances: directly, by thrusting health expenditure in the
event of illness and indirectly, by affecting the income earning capacity of households
10
(Asfaw et al. 2002). Hence the need for a two-pronged strategy: one, aimed at improving
the health status of the poor, and two, protecting them from the financial consequences in
                                                
7 Depending on an individual response to dealing with risks, the literature classifies all risk management
practices into three broad groups: risk reduction (RR), risk mitigation (RM) strategies and risk coping
(RC) strategies. The former two strategies are ex ante risk management strategies (that is, used before a
risky event takes place) whereas the later one is an ex post strategy (that is after the event takes place).
Insurance, similar to savings and borrowings, is a part of risk mitigation strategy (Brown and Churchill
1999, Holzmann and Joergensen 2000).
8 Insurability  of  risks  depends  on  the  characteristics  of  risk.  Literature  on  risk  management  approach
classifies  risks  alone  several  lines.  For  example,  depending  on  the  nature  of  risks:  whether  risk  is
independent vs. correlated, high frequency low cost vs. low frequency high costs, or depending on the
appropriate agency handling risks. On insurability of risks, see Jütting 2002, Brown and Churchill 1999,
Siegel and Alwang 1999.
9  Unlike many health risks, political, social and institutional risks are often covariate in nature (Weinberger
and Jütting 2000).
10 The literature recognises that improvement in health status is not just the result of higher incomes but is
also an input into generating higher incomes, especially for the poor. This linkage has been recently
demonstrated in the work of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health of the WHO (CMH 2001).4
the event of illness. For this reason micro-insurance that essentially protects households
against the financial consequence of illness is regarded as a complement to, and not as a
substitute for, other health interventions.
Amidst shrinking government budgets, failure of the markets to reach the poor and
widespread criticism of levying user charges, community based arrangements have aroused
much interest and hope in meeting  health  care  challenges  facing  the  poor,  and micro-
insurance is considered to be an important financing tool for protecting the poor  from
adverse  financial  consequences  in  the  event  of  sickness.  While  the  out-of-pocket
expenditure  on  illness  in  spot  payments  imposes  great  financial  hardship  on  the  poor,
community based health insurance is seen as an effective way in financing health care
costs.  Health  insurance  by  pooling  of  risks  across  members  who  participate  in  health
insurance lessens the financial burden of members affected by illness. Indeed, several types
of  community  based  health  insurance  schemes  have  emerged  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa
(Wiesmann  and  Jütting  2000,  Atim  1998),  Asia  (Krause  2000)  and  in  other  regions
(Bennett et al. 1998, Jakab and Krishnan 2001).
11 Some of these are community based,
while  others  are  based  on  membership  to  a  particular  group.  In  this  paper  these
community-based and member-based arrangements are collectively referred as community
financing schemes. In some cases, health insurance feature is embedded in the other types
                                                
11 Four  models  of  micro-insurance  have  been  discussed  in  the  literature.  In  the  partner-agent  model,
insurers, health care providers and organisers of the scheme decide on the insurance-cum-health care
package. In  a community-based insurance model policyholders are owners and managers of all aspects of
insurance operations. The full-service model is similar to formal sector insurance provision, and finally,
the  provider  model  where  the  health  care  provider  and  insurer  are  the  same  party,  with  insurance
coverage is restricted to the services provided by the health care provider. (Siegel et al. 2001). These
arrangements should not be confused with other community schemes that merely subsidise the cost of
health care for the poor sick people. Such schemes are devoid of any risk pooling.5
of functions that a community or member based organisations provide
12. In fact, some
micro-finance  programs  have  successfully  introduced  insurance  on  a  limited  scale
(Morduch 1999b).
Community  health  care  financing  schemes  are  usually  based  on  the  following
characteristics: voluntary membership, non-profit objective, link to a health care provider
(often hospital in the area), risk pooling and relying on an ethic of mutual aid/solidarity.
Their advantage lies in being able to reach low-income people in rural areas and working
in the informal sector who are otherwise difficult to reach, able to exploit social capital in
bringing  about  greater  awareness,  correcting  for  adverse  selection  and  moral  hazard
problems
13 and encouraging preventive measures, and increased access to health care. But
community based schemes also have certain weaknesses such as low capital base, low
level of revenue mobilisation, frequent exclusion of the poorest of the poor, small size of
risk pool, limited management capacity, isolation from more comprehensive benefits.
However,  the  reach  of  the  existing  micro  insurance  schemes  is  still  low  and
attempts are being made to bring more and more people under its ambit, by up-scaling and
extending and replicating the schemes. In extending the reach of micro insurance, demand
side and supply side factors and factors relating to design and development of scheme are
                                                
12 To give one example of this, the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) in Gujarat (India) has the
basic objective to help the poor generate income for themselves. Since 1992, it also started providing
medical insurance to its member (for more on SEWA, see Ranson 2001).
13  Both  these  problems  arise  due  to  informational  asymmetry  between  seller  and  buyer  of  insurance.
Generally, buyer of insurance is more well-informed about his health status and the care level taken by
him. While adverse selection problem tends to reduce the size of membership, the moral hazard problem
leads to over-consumption of benefits covered under the scheme.6
important (Dror and Jacquier 1999, Wiesmann and Jütting 2000, Siegel  et  al.  2001).
14
However,  the  focus  of  the  present  paper  is  only  on  the  demand  side  factors  and  in
particular on the issue of affordability.
15
By and large the literature on demand side is still thin.
16 A few micro-level studies
that  have  tried  to  estimate  demand  for  health  insurance  based  on  the  willingness-and-
ability-to-pay for health insurance have come out with positive findings. A survey-based
study on the willingness to pay even in case of Ethiopia - one of the poorest countries in
the Sub-Sahara Africa - shows that the poor are willing to pay up to 5 % of their monthly
income (Asfaw et al. 2002) for having a scheme that can take care of their costs of illness.
A review of various existing schemes by Jakab and Krishnan (2001) highlights that (a)
micro-insurance schemes can raise substantial resources but need to get additional funds by
donor agencies, the state or health care providers, and (b) the poorest of the poor in a
community are often excluded from the schemes. In order to increase the access of these
people some schemes have developed mechanisms which lower entrance barriers for the
poorest, e.g. flexibility in premium collection and exemption mechanisms.
                                                
14  This  classification  is  only  for  the  sake  of  simplicity.  In  reality  one  expects  these  factors  to  be
interdependent. For example, weak supply of health care services may be the result as well as the cause of
poor demand. Similarly, if the design of health insurance scheme is poor, it may fail to attract households
(see Dror and Jacquier 1999).
15  This is not to deny the role of other demand side factors such as social and cultural milieu in which the
poor live, access to other risk management instruments and so on. To give an example of how social
cultural factors pose a barrier to demand for insurance, in some societies people believe that to think
about  the  consequences  of  one’s  ill-health  or  death  is  to  wish  oneself  the  same.  Similarly,  in  some
societies people interpret ill-health as the wish of gods or links it to one’s fate and hence refuse any
medical treatment and turn to religious head (Wiesmann and Jütting 2000).
16  Much of the existing literature on micro-insurance focuses attention on supply and institutional issues
(Siegel  et  al.  2001).  In  the  words  of  Brown  and  McCord  (2000),  “The  limited  understanding  of
households’  needs,  preferences,  and  expectations  will  have  to  be  deepened,  if  future  experiments  in
micro-insurance are to be “demand-driven.”7
One of the common perceptions about the poor is that the poor are too poor to
either save or buy insurance. In other words, the poor are too poor to buy insurance. While
this may be true for the poorest of the poor who struggle for survival every day, this need
not to be true for those living close to the poverty line (Martin et al. 1999, Zeller and
Sharma  1998).  For  people  living  close  to  poverty  line,  their  apparent  inability  to  join
insurance scheme may not be the result of affordability per se but may be the result of
institutional rigidities such as credit constraint that may be preventing their latent demand
from translating itself into effective demand for health insurance. In such situation, easing
credit constraint rather than subsidising premium may help improve the reach of micro
insurance schemes. How borrowing constraint impinge on demand for insurance by a poor
household is demonstrated in the next section.
III  The Analytics of Insurance Demand
17
In this section we first analyse how a borrowing constraint may affect the demand
for insurance in general, and then, show how it influences insurance demand in case of
poor households.
18
                                                
17  Demand for insurance, which is mandated by the providers of credit to the poor needs to be distinguished
from the demand for insurance necessitated purely by health considerations. In the former case, insurance
protects the interest of the creditor against the risk of default in the event of the borrower falling ill. In the
latter case insurance protects the financial interest of the borrower in the event of  his/her  falling ill.
Furthermore, in the former case premium is deducted from the credit extended to a borrower, and in the
latter case, timings and mode of premium collection are important determinants of demand for health
insurance. In this section we analyse the latter case.
18  See Eswaran and Kotwal (1989, 1990) on how borrowing constraint affects adoption of technology by
farmers as well as on how such constraint shape their risk preference (also see Morduch (1994). See
Besley 1995 on the effect of borrowing constraints on the savings behaviour.8
III.1  The general case
For this, we consider a two-period model in which a typical risk averse individual
faces no uncertainty in the first period and therefore has a fixed given income y. In the
second period, however, the individual (or household) has random income. For simplicity
we assume that there are only two possible states of nature: a good state in which the
individual income is y+z and a bad state in which his income is y-z. The bad state in the
current context is the state of the individual falling sick.
19 The probability of the bad state,
denoted as p, is assumed to be 0.5. The risk averse behaviour is captured by the restriction
on the utility function, U, that is by its strict concavity (i.e., U’>0 and U’’<0). Expected
utility of the individual in the absence of insurance is given as:
EU=U(y)+ 1/2 {U(y-z)+(y+z)}
Notice that the income loss suffered by the individual in period 2 should the bad
state show up, is 2z, and that the discount factor is assumed to be 1 (unity).
20
Let’s first consider the case where the individual faces no borrowing constraint.
Furthermore, assume that the individual can buy as much insurance coverage as he likes at
actuarially fair price.
21 From the standard result on insurance literature, at actuarially fair
                                                
19  In case of illness, the individual not only suffers income loss but also loss on account of having to bear
cost of illness (i.e., of medicines etc.). In the model we do not distinguish between these two costs and
treat the entire loss to be insurable.
20  This is a simplifying assumption that implies that the future is as much dearer to the individual as is the
present.
21  Actuarially fair price is the price at which insurance company selling insurance makes zero-expected
profits. This condition characterises competitive insurance market. In the absence of zero transaction
costs, the actuarially fair price is the same as probability of bad state showing up.9
price, the utility maximising individual would demand full insurance coverage (see Mas-
Colell  et  al.  1995,  pp.  187-188).  If  D  represents  demand  for  insurance,  full  coverage
implies D*=2z. The utility of the individual after the maximisation would be:
EU=U(y-z+B)+U(y+z-B),
where  B  represents  borrowings  by  the  individual.  Since  we  have  assumed  no
borrowings  constraint,  the  optimal  borrowing  is  one  that  equalises  income  in  the  two
periods. This occurs when B*=z. Substituting B* in the above condition equation yields
EU*=2U(y).
If the individual faces a borrowing constraint (i.e., B*<z) his demand for insurance
would be partial. To demonstrate this, suppose that the individual cannot borrow at all. If
the individual still demands full insurance his utility would be: U(y-z)+U(y+z), which is
lower than his initial utility (i.e., U(y)+1/2{U(y-z)+U(y+z)}), suggesting that he would
demand partial and not full insurance.
22 Now, if we allow for some borrowing but the
borrowing falls short of the optimal level, the demand for insurance would continue to be
partial.
More generally, starting from a point where the individual demands partial or no
insurance  and  faces  a  borrowing  constraint,  individual’s  demand  for  insurance  would
                                                
22  This follows directly from the definition of risk aversion which yields, U(y) > (1/2){U(y-z)+U(y+z)}.10
increase as the borrowing constraint is relaxed. This result is formally stated and proved in
the proposition given in Appendix I to this paper.
III.2  Demand for insurance by the poor
Since the paper deals specifically with the demand for insurance by the poor, we
characterise them by the assumption that they are at (or close to) their subsistence level in
the current period (i.e., period 1), and face credit constraint which is a well known fact
about the poor in the developing world. An important implication of this assumption is that
the poor cannot spare much, if at all, from their current income for insuring their future.
Let  c denote the minimum consumption needed by the individual the keep him at  the
subsistence level. In the above construct, let the relationship between c, y and z be defined
by the condition, y-z < c= y. What this condition implies is that the individual is just able
to meet his minimum consumption (defined by c) in period 1. In period 2, the individual
runs the risk of falling below his subsistence level (or the poverty line) in case the bad state
shows up. In this case, if the individual cannot borrow at all, he will not demand any
insurance.  However,  if  the  individual  could  borrow,  he  would  demand  full  insurance,
yielding utility EU*=2U(y). Thus, the individual is able to keep himself afloat the poverty
line  (i.e.,  able  to  meet  minimum  consumption  needs  in  both  periods).  The  example  is
specifically  constructed  to  highlight  the  importance  of  subsistence  consumption  that
constraints demand for insurance by a poor individual. If the poor individual is allowed to
borrow  against  his  future  income  his  demand  for  insurance  would  go  up.  This  is  the
situation in which people are aware of the benefits of purchasing insurance but cannot set
aside any  money  from  their  current  income  for  this  purpose.  In  reality,  borrowing  for11
insurance need not necessarily take the form of actually taking credit at the prevailing
interest rate. In fact, many schemes are so designed as to take account of this fact. For
example, flexible premium option is one of the ways of addressing this issue. Creating a
common pool of funds that can be used to give soft loans to group members is another
way. Although the literature on micro-insurance is thin, there is some evidence already
available to this effect.
 23 In fact, many micro-finance organisations dealing with savings
and credit have been successful in introducing and running micro-insurance schemes.
24
Although in the above construct we equate consumption to income (c=y), it is not
crucial for the result. To show this, assume that c<y, that is, the subsistence constraint is
not rigidly defined. Assume further that the individual cannot borrow at all. In the normal
case (in the case of non-poor) we noted above that in the absence of any borrowing facility,
the individual would demand partial insurance. Let this partial coverage be denoted by z
o.
Now in case of poor individual, who is faced with subsistence constrained, he may not be
able to buy even this partial coverage. This would be the case when {y- (z
o/2)} < c < y,
that is, when the amount over and above his subsistence consumption is insufficient to pay
premium required for this coverage. In this situation, his demand for insurance would be
lower than z
o, and allowing for borrowing would then increase this demand level.
                                                
23  The authors visited a micro-insurance experiment in T. Narsipur region of Karnataka (India) where soft
loans among members of self-help groups is common. The loan can be used for any purpose, including
paying insurance premium.
24  A  recent  ILO  Compendium  of  micro  insurance  schemes  in  India  shows  that  about  one-third  of  the
insurance schemes are initaited by micro finance organisations.12
To show that the above analysis is not a special case, we do some robustness test.
In particular, we check how lack of access to credit affects demand for insurance under two
different income scenarios (i.e., different combination of present and future income). This
is shown in Appendix II where we find that the above result is applicable to alternate
income scenarios also, and is not due to the specific example constructed above.
Thus, in the above analysis we show how subsistence constraint faced by the poor
who  can  otherwise  afford  insurance,  interferes  with  their  purchase  decision,  and  how
access to credit can mitigates the effect of subsistence constraint.
In needs to be stressed that the setting we outline above is applicable not to the
poorest of the poor for whom affordability is indeed the major issue and thus are dependent
on public subsidy.
25 This setting is applicable to those who, though currently living above
or on the poverty line, are likely to fall into poverty trap in the event of any major health
shock.
26  If  such  people  have  access  to  credit,  their  need  for  health  insurance  may  get
translated in terms of effective demand for insurance, which fails due to their subsistence
constraint,  and  through  purchase  of  insurance  they  may  be  able  to  protect  themselves
against the risk of falling into poverty trap.
                                                
25  The  poorest  of  the  poor  would  not  buy  insurance  even  if  some  credit  is  made  available  to  them.
According to Dror and Jacquier (1999), the needs of the excluded (the poorest of the poor) are often not
structured in terms of “solvent demand.”
26  According to Holzmann (2001) the group of poor that moves in and out of poverty is strikingly large
compared to the group that is always poor (poor at all dates). In fact, one could further subdivide the poor
who move in and out of the poverty, depending on their income prospects.13
The existing literature points to the circularity between poverty and vulnerability:
that is, the poor people are more vulnerable (exposed to risk) and their vulnerability is the
cause of their poverty. In other words, the link runs both ways (Martin et al 1999). The
above analysis shows how the presence of credit constraint might be reinforcing this link,
and how this link can be severed by the easing of such constraint. Another aspect where
the above analysis can be useful is in understanding the order of priority between savings
and credit on one hand and insurance on the other. Whereas the importance of financial
services  (savings, insurance and credit) in risk management literature is well recognised, it
is not clear how to prioritise the allocation of public funding and effort between savings
and insurance. That is, whether access to voluntary, flexible withdrawal of savings and
credit should receive a higher priority (over insurance) or should insurance be assigned
higher priority than savings and credit. From the above analysis it follows that savings and
credit functions should at least be undertaken concurrently with insurance, if not before
insurance. Perhaps, it is appropriate to embed micro-insurance function in the micro-credit
schemes that are already in place—the point about which there is some mention in the
literature (Sadoulet 2001).
IV  The Role of Public Intervention
Nobody  doubts  the  need  for  public  health  intervention  for  the  poor  living  in
developing  countries.  Where  affordability  is  the  issue,  government  subsidy  is  clearly
needed  and  an  important  policy  issue  here  is  the  extent  and  the  appropriate  form  that
subsidy  should  take.  This  deceptively  simple  model  is  powerful  enough  to  highlight
several aspects.14
First,  public  intervention  has  an  important  role  in  up-scaling,  extending  and
replicating micro-insurance schemes that have emerged as promising route for health care
financing. One important role is in removing of institutional rigidities present, for example,
in labor, credit and product markets. These rigidities may take the form of pre-existing
patron-client relationships, inter-linking of wage and credit contracts, various government
controls and so on. 
27 Presence of such rigidities prevents the poor from fully participating
in market opportunities. The above analysis shows that removing these rigidities, and in
particular,  easing  of  credit  constraint  may  be  an  appropriate  way  of  translating  latent
demand into effective demand for insurance. However, this channel is likely to work for
the poor who are currently able to meet their basic needs but face the risk of falling into
poverty  trap.  For  people  who  can  afford  premium  but  for  the  institutional  rigidities,
subsidising premium may not be an appropriate strategy. In fact, subsidising premiums
bears a disadvantage that it may aggravate associated moral hazard problems.
Second, for the poorest of the poor, who are already below poverty line, easing of
credit is unlikely to generate insurance demand. If credit is made available to them, it will
in all probability be used in meeting their current basic needs than for hedging against risks
in the future. The poorest of the poor need direct public support for meeting their health
care needs. Their health care needs can be met either directly through free access to public
health care services or indirectly by integrating them into micro-insurance schemes and
                                                
27  These controls may, for example, take the form of preventing free movement of agricultural produce. The
rigidity may also take the form of local government not being responsive to the needs of local people.15
subsidising  premium.  The  idea  behind  integrating  the  poorest  of  the  poor  into  micro-
insurance schemes is to enlarge the risk pool and thereby make the existing schemes more
stable. Without subsidising premium, the poorest of the poor can hardly be integrated into
such schemes since no resource pooling (distinct from risk pooling) can be effected by
selling  insurance  to  them.  How  can  they  be  integrated?  Supposing,  a  micro-insurance
agency is already offering insurance to members of a village community in which some
members  are  too  poor  to  be  able  to  afford  insurance.  If  government  has  a  policy  of
subsidising  the  premium  for  these  poorest  members  then  the  insuring  agency  can,  for
example,  collect  premium  from  the  government  after  submitting  a  proof  of  having
provided insurance to the poorest of the poor, who can be well identified.
Third, some inferences can be drawn on the design and the development of micro-
insurance scheme. For example, schemes that allow for flexibility in payment of premium
(small amounts collected more often; allowing premium in kind as well) are more likely to
succeed  because  such  flexibility  can  in  fact  serve  the  role  of  credit.
28  Perhaps,  credit
facility can be in-built into the schemes by having a separate pool that can be used for
paying premiums of members who are unable to make payments in time. Also, linking
credit exclusively for the payment of premium may also check against its dissipation in
meeting other less urgent needs.
                                                
28  Allowing flexibility in paying premium is similar, in effect, to extending credit facility to the individual
who buys insurance for the purpose of paying premium. The credit gets returned when the individual
actually pays the premium amount.16
More  broadly,  public  intervention  can  play  an  important  role  in  risk  reduction
activities  such  as  improved  sanitation,  preventive  health  care  and  controlling  for
communicable diseases. The burden of these shocks falls inequitably on the poor. Public
intervention can contribute to the success of micro-insurance schemes by insuring against
covariate risks that undermine micro-insurance arrangements against uncorrelated shocks.
Moreover, public intervention can also make micro-insurance program viable at least in the
early stages of their formation when, because of limited risk  pooling  capacity  of  such
programs and because of low capital base, these programs may have difficulty in breaking
even.  Reinsurance,  which  is  a  mechanism  designed  to  guarantee  the  solvency  of
institutions providing insurance, is one of the ways in which public intervention could
contribute  to  the  viability  of  the  schemes  (Dror  and  Preker  2002).
29  Because  micro-
insurance is generally offered to a targeted population living in close proximity, the risk
pool is not well diversified across geography, occupation, age etc. Hence, there is a greater
need to parcel out the risk by transferring (also called ceding) it to a specialised agency (re-
insurer) that insures the insurers. Just as the poor have no  access to insurance, micro-
insurance institutions too typically have no access to reinsurance. So, reinsurance could be
one  way  of  public  intervention.  Public  intervention  could  also  bring  about  greater
awareness among the people about protection through insurance.
30
                                                
29 Reinsurance in the context of micro-insurance is also known by the name of Social Re
30  In  this  context  it  is  also  important  to  recognise  what  public  intervention  should  not  do  as  some
interventions may actually have a negative impact on the functioning of community financing schemes
(Hsiao 2001).17
V  Conclusion
In the context of the discussion on extending the reach of micro-insurance scheme,
which  hold  promise  for  reducing  health  related  shocks  facing  poor  households,  it  is
essential to make a distinction between those who can afford health insurance and those
who  cannot.  Lack  of  demand  for  insurance  need  not  necessarily  be  the  result  of
affordability per se, and thereby justifying the need of government subsidy, but may be the
result of other institutional rigidities such as borrowing or credit constraint. This would
mean, that it is probably wise for donor agencies to look for potentials to embed micro-
insurance in existing micro-credit schemes rather than building micro-insurance schemes
from  scratch.  Further  research  should  test  this  hypothesis  in  an  empirical  setting  by
analysing if micro-insurance schemes have faired better in an environment were credit is
less  binding  or  where  credit  facility  is  inbuilt  into  such  schemes  than  those  in  which
availability of credit is more restricted.18
Appendix I
Proposition: If the credit available to the  credit-constrained individual is increased, his
demand for insurance too will increase.
Proof:
The individual has the following objective function:
Max EU=U(y-0.5 D+B)+ 1/2 {U(y-z+D-B)+U(y+z-B)}
{D}
The first order condition (where D° denotes the optimal coverage) would be:
(-0.5)U’(y - 0.5 D°+B)+ 0.5 U’(y-z+D°-B) = 0
or
U' (y - 0.5 D°+B) = U' (y-z+D°-B)
The above condition implies, (y - 0.5 D°+B) = (y-z + D°-B), which upon rearranging
yields D° = (2B+z)/1.5. In the unconstrained case we mentioned that B* = z. Substituting
this in above equality confirms that optimal insurance in the unconstrained case is D* = 2z.
However, if the individual is credit constrained (i.e., B*<z), it constrains his demand for
insurance as well i.e., D° < 2z. To see how D°(B) changes with B, differentiate the f.o.c
totally with respect to B. It yields:
(-0.5)U’’(y - 0.5 D°+B) (-0.5 dD°/dB +1) + 0.5 U’’(y-z +D°-B) (dD°/dB –1) = 0
dD°/dB = {U’’(y - 0.5 D°+B) + U’’(y-z +D°-B)}/ {0.5 U’’(y - 0.5 D°+B) + U’’(y-z +D°-
B)}
dD°/dB > 0, implying demand for insurance would increase as credit constraint is relaxed.19
Appendix II
We consider two different income scenarios (i.e., different combination of present  and
future income), and each scenario has two cases, depending on the assumption about the
subsistence constraint.
Income Scenario (a): If EU = U(y)+1/2{U(y)+U(y-z)}. In this scenario, while first period
income continues to be y, it is the second period income which is different now : it could
be y or (y-z) each with probability one-half.
Case (i): {y-(z/2)}< c < y, the individual will only demand partial insurance because with
full insurance his first period income will fall  below  his  subsistence  consumption  (the
expression {y-(z/2)} denotes income less insurance premium for full loss coverage).
Case (ii): c < {y-(z/2)}, the individual will demand full insurance since with full insurance
individual gets highest utility (U(y-z/2)+U(y)) compared to the case of either no insurance
or partial insurance.
Income Scenario (b): If EU = U(y)+ 1/2{U(y)+U(y+z)}. In this scenario too income in the
first period remains y, but the second period income now could be y or (y+z), each with
probability one-half.
Case  (iii):  {y-(z/2)}  <  c  <  y,  the  individual  will  demand  only  partial  insurance  since
subsistence constraint becomes binding before the individual reaches full insurance level.20
Case (iv): c< {y-(z/2)}, the individual may still demand full insurance. In the context of the
result in the paper, the relevant cases are (i) and (iii) as it is in these cases that subsistence
constraint becomes binding which can be eased by having access to credit.
31 Note that in
the  above  cases  we  have  deliberately  omitted  the  possibility  of  (y  <  c)  since  this  is
applicable to those who cannot meet even their subsistence consumption, i.e., the poorest
of the poor.
                                                
31  If c< y, and if there are some (fixed) transaction costs (say T) upfront in buying insurance the individual
may be tempted to self-insure by setting aside (or save, s) the excess of income over consumption (s = y-
c) in the first period (i.e., saving in physical or financial form) rather than buy (partial) insurance. If the
transaction costs are greater than the excess of income over consumption in the first period (T > y-c), the
individual would not be able to buy insurance even if he wanted to.21
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